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Contract Law
Symbolic but sensible   the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999
by Andrew Tettenborn
We all know about the proud mother 
watching the Sandhurst passing-out 
parade, who said to her neighbour, 'Can 
you see our Willie there? He's the only 
one in step.' Until last year English law 
was in much the same position in 
preventing strangers from enforcing 
contracts concluded for their benefit. 
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999 now briskly aligns us with virtually 
the whole of the US, New Zealand, and a 
respectable part of Australia   or will do 
so when fully in force in May 2000. For 
this reason, if no other, it deserves at least 
a passing comment.
THE 1999 ACT - THE BASIC 
PROVISION
The kernel of the Act (henceforward, 
with scant regard for euphony, the 
CRTPA) is s. 1. This allows strangers to 
enforce contracts made for their benefit, 
gives them the use of all the standard 
contractual remedies to do it with, and 
emphasises for good measure that they 
can now validly be exempted from 
liability pursuant to a contract as well as 
being given rights to sue for breach of it.
Section l(l)(a), allowing a third party 
to enforce a contract where it expressly 
says he can, is utterly uncontroversial, 
and is such an obviously sensible 
provision that it needs no comment 
whatever. Implied confcrral of rights on 
strangers, a more controversial topic, is 
covered by s. l(l)(b). This provides that 
a contract 'purporting to benefit' a third 
party is prima facie enforceable by him, 
unless it is clear from the circumstances 
that he was not intended to gain any legal
o J o
rights under it. Other subsections tidy up 
assorted loose ends. To avoid possible 
doubt, it is made clear that the stranger, 
provided he is adequately identified, need 
not have been in existence at the time of 
the agreement. But, if he wants to take 
the benefit of the contract, he must take 
it warts and all: as the CRTPA puts it, he 
cannot avail himself of third party 
contractual rights 'otherwise than subject 
to and in accordance with any other 
relevant terms of the contract'.
Presumptively, the stranger will in 
addition take subject to anv contractual 
defence or set-off which would have been 
pleadable against the promisee himself, 
and to any defence or set-off relating 
to his own position (for example 
where he has himself induced the 
promisor to contract by virtue of a 
misrepresentation) .
Lastly, there is the issue of cancellation 
  which has often worried academic 
commentators, though its practical 
implications may well be minor. (One 
case where it might matter is where A Ltd 
sells property to B Ltd and B agrees to 
pay the price in instalments to C Ltd, an 
associated company of A. Were A to go 
into liquidation, its liquidator might well 
wish to persuade B to cancel the 
obligation to pay C and pay a slightly 
smaller sum instead to himself.) If 
promisor and promisee want to take 
away the third party's rights without his 
permission after the contract is entered 
into, s. 2 allows them to do so by mutual 
agreement, but only for a limited time. 
The stranger's rights presumptively 
become irrevocable when he either 
expressly accepts them, or foreseeably 
relies on them, or relies on them to the 
knowledge of the promisor. However, 
this is only a presumption: the 
contractors are given an express power to 
stipulate that the third party's rights 
remain revocable indefinitely.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
NEW RIGHTS
Those are the bare bones of the new 
third party right created by CRTPA, s. 1 . 
What use will actually be made of it is less 
clear. To find the answer, we shall simply 
have to wait and see. But a few 
speculations may be in order.
First, it is suggested that the section 
may well be more often excluded before 
the event than invoked after it. Contract 
draftsmen are ultra-cautious beasts and 
they have a pathological, if 
understandable, fear of unexpected 
liabilities. In drawing up any agreement, 
their instinct will undoubtedly be to
include a clause ruling out any liability to 
those other than the original contracting 
parties.
In some specialised situations, however, 
the new dispensation \vill undoubtedly be 
taken advantage of. Third-party 
exemption clauses will no doubt 
proliferate: not only in the shipping 
context where previous problems have 
arisen (see, e.g. Scruttons v Midland Silicones 
[1962] AC 446 and The Eurymedon [1975] 
AC 154, the best-known cases on 
exemption clauses and third parties), but 
elsewhere too. For example, in 
construction contracts, head contractors 
engaging subcontractors may well wish 
expressly to insulate the site owner from 
liability for damage to" subcontractors'J o
plant and equipment, and the 
subcontractors from liability for harm to 
the site owner's premises (see, e.g. Normch 
City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828 
and British Telecommunications pic v James 
Thomson &_ Sons (Engineers) Ltd [1999] 
1 WLR 9). Again in the construction 
context, warranties to potential 
purchasers contained in the original 
construction contract may possibly 
replace the traditional 'duty of care deed'. 
In property deals, the section may well be 
used to render enforceable promises by 
buyers to pay part of the price to some 
third party, either an associated company 
or a financier.
KERNEL OF THE ACT
The kernel of the Act ... is s. 1. This 
allows strangers to enforce contracts 
made for their benefit, gives them the 
use of all the standard contractual 
remedies to do it with, and emphasises 
for good measure that they can now 
validly be exempted from liability 
pursuant to a contract as well as being 
given rights to sue for breach of it.
Interestingly, s. 1 may also provide a 
way for borrowers to create a new kind of 
non-registrable security over book debts. 
A company, for example, contracts with 
its customers that the latter will pay its 
financier direct, arrangements being
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made for the moneys to be paid into a 
particular account and (between the 
company and the financier) for the 
company to be permitted to draw on 
them with the financier's consent. The 
financier's right to sue the customers 
appears pretty watertight: yet, on the 
basis that the debts were at all times 
payable to it and not to the company, it is 
difficult to see how this could be 
construed as creating a charge of any 
sort, let alone a registrable one, over the 
debts concerned.
FEAR
... [s.l] may well be more often 
excluded before the event than 
invoked after it. Contract draftsmen 
are ultra-cautious beasts and they have 
a pathological, if understandable, fear 
of unexpected liabilities.
Most of the serious argument, one 
suspects, will centre round s. l(l)(b), 
dealing with instances when third party 
contractual rights are to be regarded as 
arising by implication. Put shortly, this 
says that a contract term 'purporting to 
benefit' a third party will prima facie give 
that third party the right to invoke it, 
unless the promisor in turn proves a lack 
of intention to give him enforceable legalo o
rights. What is worth noting about thiso o
provision is that, however open-ended it 
may look at first sight, it is likely to be 
interpreted rather narrowly. The Law 
Commission's report   which will, no 
doubt, inform any judicial approaches on 
the point   effectively suggests that a 
contract 'purports to benefit' someone 
only if performance is to be rendered 
directly to him or on his property. So 
while promises to pay a third party 
money, insure his life or extend his house 
are in, White v Jones ([1995] 2 AC 207) 
and similar professional negligence 
scenarios are out, being left exclusively in 
the province of tort. In promising to 
draft my will properly, my solicitor is not 
undertaking to benefit my heirs, but 
instead to give me facilities to do so, 
which is (apparently) something quite 
different. Furthermore, in one vital case 
where performance does go directly to 
the third party   where a building 
subcontractor does work on a site 
owner's property by arrangement with 
the head contractor   the Commission 
suggest that there will still be no direct 
right in the site owner, this time because 
of an implicit intention not to give him
one (on the rather lame basis that 
everybody knows that this is what the 
parties want, although whether an 
argument of this sort would necessarily 
convince a court is open to question).
One further comment on s. l(l)(b). 
The subsection may, perhaps surprisingly, 
be apt to cover a number of situations 
currently dealt with under equitable 
doctrine. Notable examples are (a) where 
A sells land to B against B's undertaking 
to respect the rights of a third party, such 
as a sitting tenant C (see, e.g. Binions v 
Evans [1972] Ch. 359); (b) secret trusts; 
and (c) mutual wills. Although the Act is 
at pains to preserve rather than supplant 
existing non-contractual machinery for 
enforcing third party promises, all these 
situations arguably sit more comfortably 
in a contractual than an equitable setting. 
Their gradual absorption into 
mainstream contract cannot be ruled 
out. (Compare dicta in Staib v Powell 
[1979] Qd R 987, suggesting that secret 
trusts might be enforceable in contract 
under Queensland anti-privity legislation 
  which had not, however, been in force 
at the time of the events concerned.)
OTHER ISSUES
A number of other specific issues dealt 
with by the Act are worth brief mention.
Holding the ring between promisee 
and third party
No doubt because of the 
awkwardnesses of privity, in a number of 
cases ways have been found to let the 
promisee himself recover damages so as 
to provide some measure of de facto 
protection for deserving third parties. 
These range from the orthodox (where 
the promisor's failure to benefit the 
stranger made the promisee himself 
liable to him) to the very artificial (as 
where construction contractors engaged 
by the promisee bungle works on a 
stranger's land, but do not thereby
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trigger any liability of the promisee to the 
stranger; see also Alfred McAlpine 
Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [1998] 58 
Con LR 46 and Jackson v Horizon Holidays 
Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468, indemnifying a 
father for his family's displeasure at a 
ruined holiday   another notorious 
instance). No doubt some of the latter 
will gently wither away now the third 
party can be given a direct right: but 
potential for double recovery must 
remain. This problem is covered in s. 4
and 5. Having preserved the promisee's 
existing rights in s. 4, s. 5 then goes on to 
say that once the promisee has recovered 
damages reflecting either the stranger's 
loss or his own liability to compensate 
the stranger, credit must be given for this 
recovery in any subsequent action by the 
third party. There is an element of rough 
justice in this   the stranger loses out 
entirely if the promisee recovers in 
respect of his loss and then goes 
bankrupt without having paid over what 
he got   but it is probably unavoidable. 
The statute does not say what happens if 
both promisee and stranger sue at the 
same time for what is in essence the same 
loss. (For example, if A agrees with B to 
pay B's debt of £100 to C, both B and C 
now have impeccable rights to sue A:B 
under s. 4, and C under s. 1 . The point 
may become more important since the 
confirmation in Total Liban SAL v Vital 
Energy SA [2000] 1 All ER 267 that in 
such a case B can sue A whether or not he 
has actually paid C.) Presumably both 
actions can be consolidated: but if they 
are, which of the two claimants, both of 
whom have a good cause of action, gets 
priority in any award? One can only hope 
that a bold court will create a practice of 
preferring the third party in the event of 
such competition, since it is to him that 
payment ultimately ought to go.
Exemption from liability
We have already seen that third parties 
can now benefit from exemption clauses. 
The converse issue also arises of how far 
the third party's rights, conferred by the 
CRTPA, should be able to be taken away 
or limited by contrary agreement. On 
this the CRTPA takes a sensible and 
robust view: since contracting parties do 
not have to give strangers any rights in the 
first place, there can be no objection to 
giving them curtailed or nugatory ones if 
they wish to. Section 7(2) makes the 
necessary dispositions to prevent the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 interfering 
with the parties' agreement in this 
respect.
Arbitration
Arbitration is awkward. The Law 
Commission reluctantly declined to 
recommend any provision about it, on 
the basis that if the matter was dealt with 
properly a stranger would in certain cases 
have to be bound by an arbitration clause 
he had never agreed to, and that such a 
recommendation would go beyond their
25
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remit. The House of Lords showed no 
such timiditv, and the workmanlike 
clause which was introduced there and 
became CRTPA, s. 8 is the result.
Section 8(1) effectively applies the 
'warts and all' provision in s. 1(5) to 
arbitration clauses. Where a term giving a 
stranger a right under s. 1 contains an 
arbitration clause,
' ... the third party shall be treated Jor the 
purposes of that Act as a party to the 
arbitration agreement as regards disputes 
between himself and the promisor relating to 
the enforcement of the substantive term by the 
third party.'
The effect of this is that the stranger can 
take advantage of the clause (so as to 
demand that the promisor arbitrate his 
claim), but is conversely bound to 
respect it (thus giving the promisor a 
right to a stay if the stranger sues him in 
the ordinary courts). But it is worth 
noting that the section goes a good deal
o o o
further. It is not limited, as it might have 
been, to where the stranger seeks to sue 
on the term, but rather deems him to be 
a party to the arbitration clause as regards 
all disputes concerning the substantive 
term (or, in the case of an exception 
clause, the right to invoke it in courto
proceedings), whoever may have raised 
them. Suppose, for example, that the
promisor seeks a declaration that he is 
not bound vis-a-vis the stranger by the 
clause concerned. Although the stranger 
may never have lifted a finger to enforce 
the contract, and never in fact agreed to 
submit to any arbitral tribunal whatever, 
he can it seems be bound willy-nilly to 
incur the trouble and expense of 
arbitrating the promisor's claim. (This 
could have disturbing implications, 
bearing in mind that all parties to an 
arbitration, including presumably 
persons deemed to be parties under 
CRTPA, s. 8, are jointly bound to 
contribute to the arbitrator" fee; and, 
incidentally, that the relevant provision 
imposing this liability   the Arbitration Act 




The CRTPA, s. 8(2), 
straightforward. It deals 
situation where contracting parties agree 
that non-contractual claims which either 
may have against a named stranger shall 
be arbitrated. In this case the stranger 
may if sued insist on arbitration, and if he 
chooses to do so will thereafter be bound 
by any order the arbitrator makes. 
(Hence the clause deeming him to have 
been a party to the arbitration clause 
'immediately before the exercise of the 
right'. If this were not there, the stranger 
would be able to eat his cake and have it:
he could stay any court proceedings on 
the basis that he was a third party 
beneficiary of the arbitration clause and, 
in addition, decline to honour any 
arbitrator's award on the basis that he 
was not bound by it!)
EXCEPTIONS
Three areas of contract law are 
expressly left untouched by the CRTPA 
on the basis that existing specialised 
regimes should not be upset. They are all 
fairly predictable: bills of exchange and 
other negotiable instruments, the 
'deemed contract' between members of a 
company under s. 14 of the Companies Act 
1985, and international contracts of 
carriage of goods by sea, rail, air and 
road, which are already governed by 
transnational conventions. A fourth 
exclusion did not appear in the Law 
Commission draft, but is an unsurprising 
New Labour addition: contracts of 
employment are not to give rise to any 
right of action by third parties against 
employees personally. (&
Andrew Tettenborn
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